Closing the Gap Between Can and May in Health-Care Providers\u27 Scopes of Practice: A Primer for Policymakers by Safriet, Barbara J.
Closing the Gap Between Can and May in
Health-Care Providers' Scopes of Practice:
A Primer for Policymakers
Barbara J. Safriett
A gap has developed within the United States health care industry
between the abilities of non-physician care providers and the activities
government regulation allows them to perform. Dominant provider groups
extensively lobby state legislators in order to obtain scope-of-practice
monopolies, which confer exclusive control over their areas of interest and
exclude other equally-capable groups from performing such services. As a
result, the excluded providers' skills are under-used, creating a systemic
inefficiency. This Essay explores the development of the current scope-of-
practice system and discusses possible solutions, including a review of
current reforms in Colorado and Ontario, Canada.
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Introduction
For the past two decades, no set of domestic policy issues has
received more attention than the financing and delivery of adequate health
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care to those who need it. The fundamental questions are
straightforward-who can do what to whom, and where and when, and get
paid for it?-but the answers have been elusive. Periodic crises concerning
skyrocketing costs, questionable quality, and inadequate availability of
care have dominated the media and policymaking agendas, leading to
episodic and uncoordinated gestures toward reform. Some of these efforts
have resulted in incremental improvements, but none has succeeded in
cutting through the Gordian knot at the heart of the system. Why is this set
of issues so apparently intractable, and how can policymakers go about
designing a rational alternative? By focusing on one specific strand of the
tangle-the so-called "scope of practice" defining each health-care
provider's lawful sphere of activity-this brief Essay will explore some of
the dynamics that drive our currently dysfunctional system and offer
illustrative possibilities for reform.
Let us begin, then, by thinking about how the typical health-care
reform story plays out. For the most part, a new problem is recognized, not
in its early stages, but only after it has fully developed and begun to create
stresses elsewhere in the cat's cradle of relationships we call "the health
care delivery system." At this juncture, the usual stakeholders are
galvanized into action. Individual providers' professional groups,
institutional providers' organizations, employers' associations, insurance
and financing federations, specialized consumer advocacy groups,
pharmaceutical and medical device manufacturers, and legislative and
regulatory entities both state and federal-all weigh in with supposed
solutions. The rhetorical palette of the resulting public debate usually tends
toward the inspirational and abstract, emphasizing such high-minded
principles as "protection of the public," "patients' rights," "accountability
and quality," "equitable access," and "professional obligation." At the
same time, behind the scenes, conversations assume a different tone, one
that concentrates on professional autonomy and control, turf, competition,
market share, and financial self-interest. The regulatory "solution" to the
crisis du jour is usually an unhappy mixture of the two, with some
measures that genuinely promote the public good and others that advance
the agendas of special interests.
It is not surprising that these proposed remedies are multi-factored,
because the origins of the problem are similarly complex. Issues of access,
cost, and quality are closely intertwined, in terms of historical
development, current practice, and regulatory policy. Often, policymakers
must address one particular facet of a problem with a woefully inadequate
view of the larger picture. What are the practical and legal contexts in
which the problem arose? What forces will be set in motion by the
proposed solution, and how are they interconnected? If policymakers are
not given the information they need to tackle these larger questions, their
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policy prescriptions are likely to be no more than marginally effective and
riddled with unintended consequences.
Nowhere, perhaps, is this dynamic more pronounced than in the area
of what is commonly known as "scope of practice"-the legislatively-
defined spheres of activity within which various types of health-care
providers ("HCPs") are authorized to practice. Consider, for example, the
plight of state legislators asked to address the quite understandable need
for school nurses to administer prescribed drugs to specified students at
appropriate times of day. Ready or not, the legislators will soon be
overwhelmed by a chorus of conflicting voices. They will hear from
organizations of pharmacists and physicians who claim, "that's our job,"
and "they're not qualified to do that." They will hear from school
principals and state Medicaid administrators, insurance companies and
public health officers, arguing over "who will pay for these drugs and this
service?" They will hear from state and federal drug control agencies and
the state pharmacy board, each insisting on jurisdiction over the record-
keeping, security, storage, and labeling of the drugs in question. They will
hear from the association of school counselors who assert that they, too,
should be permitted to administer these drugs to students and to be paid for
their services.
Lost in the resulting cacophony, of course, are the central concerns
prompting the policymaking effort. A sane starting point would be to ask:
"Do students genuinely need these services provided at school? If so, who
is appropriately qualified to provide them?" Instead, the legislative process
turns into a protracted battle about professional turf protection and control
over services and money.
Were such situations rare rather than common, little would be lost in
muddling through them as they arose. The dysfunctional dynamic captured
by this example, however, has for years been the rule rather than the
exception in state legislatures across the country-and often in Congress
and federal agencies as well. The battles generally focus on modifying the
scope of practice of one or another group of licensed HCPs: What are
those providers legally authorized to do, and under what conditions or
restrictions, if any? Frequently, the answers also affect the rate and terms
of payment available to the providers.
The ferocity and frequency of these extremely costly' battles have
frustrated, exhausted, befuddled, and cowed many a seasoned legislator.
I The costs include campaign donations to state and federal legislators, direct lobbying
expenditures, and public "information" campaigns, including full-page ads in national newspapers. For
example, the Pew Health Professions Commission Taskforce on Health Care noted that "[a] four-year
dispute between ophthalmologists and optometrists over who could treat certain eye diseases with what
medications in California reportedly cost over $1.8 million in campaign contributions alone to state
legislators." L.J. FINOCCHIO ET AL., PEW HEALTH PROFESSIONS COMM'N, STRENGTHENING
CONSUMER PROTECTION: PRIORITIES FOR HEALTH WORKFORCE REGULATION 26 (1998) [hereinafter
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And with good reason. Whenever scope-of-practice issues arise, legislators
are bombarded by heavily-financed lobbying efforts emanating from state
and national professional associations, individual health care providers
(who are also voters), and interested citizens. All of them demand
legislation that will "serve and protect the public" by expanding, limiting,
or maintaining-the preferred alternative, of course, being a function of
the potential impact of the proposed change on their immediate interests-
the authority of a particular group of HCPs to do and to get paid for doing
"X" "X' could include one or more of a wide range of actions: prescribing
drugs from a limited formulary for common conditions such as a pediatric
earache or mild depression, or ascertaining and certifying the existence of
physical impairments that would qualify for handicapped parking permits,
or diagnosing and "declaring" death, or determining the need for and
authorizing the provision of physical therapy, or fitting and providing
orthotics, or realigning dislocated joints, or giving immunizations and flu
shots to elderly people, or cleaning teeth. Together with scores of other
equally specific "body-part" requests for legislative approval, these
demands are thrust upon legislators who are both ill-prepared and
disinclined to decide what is safe, what is effective, and what is cost-
effective-and therefore to determine which groups of providers should be
authorized to give what kinds of care.
In order to grapple successfully with these recurring scope-of-practice
issues, both legislators and administrative regulators need to understand
that-contrary to what their own experiences may have led them to
believe-the various licensed health-care professions are not genetically
pre-ordained to fight one another to the death. Rather, these battles are the
logical, but not inevitable, consequence of a particular history and the
misallocation of authority to which it has given rise. These battles
originated in the development of the licensure laws in this country, and
they are perpetuated both by the static nature of law itself and by the
powerful forces of professional autonomy and control, cultural and social
status, personal income, power politics, gendered professional roles, and
uni- (rather than multi-) disciplinary education and training.
These dynamics cannot be overcome by simple legislative fiat, of
course, but they are sustained by a central feature of our current licensure
and scope-of-practice scheme that legislators can and must address: the
glaring, compelling, and growing gap between the legal authority afforded
TASKFORCE REPORT]. I was an active member of the Commission and the group that authored this
report. The sheer number of scope-of-practice bills introduced in the state legislatures each year
provides a staggering array of spending "opportunities" for various professional interest groups: In
1997, over 1,600 such bills were introduced, and a summary of some of the bills introduced in the
2000 and 2001 legislative sessions encompasses sixteen single-spaced pages. See STEPHANIE NORRIS,
HEALTH POLICY TRACKING SERVICE, SCOPE OF PRACTICE AND PRESCRIPTIVE AUTHORITY (2001);
LEGISLATIVE TRACKING SERVICE, 1997 LEGISLATIVE REVIEW (1997).
Vol. 19:301, 2002
Health-Care Providers' Scopes of Practice
many HCPs, on the one hand, and their clinical abilities, on the other. The
law defines who may provide various services, but it has not kept up very
well with the corollary question of who is able.
In fact, the training and skills of all HCP groups have increased
dramatically in recent years, tracking our growing understanding of
effective treatments for diseases and disabling conditions, of preventive
measures, and of health-promotion strategies. Among these professional
groups, however, only physicians are free of the burden of having to
reconcile their clinical abilities and their legal authority. That is, they have
a monopoly on authority, if not ability. All others, including both long-
established and emerging professions, must constantly choose between
two unattractive alternatives: foregoing the safe practice of what they have
been educated and trained to do, or risking legal sanction for stepping
outside the boundaries of their legislatively-defined, static, circumscribed,
and outdated scopes of practice. This double dichotomy-between legal
authority and clinical ability, and between physicians and all other
HCPs-is the motive force behind the needless and never-ending
legislative and regulatory battles that cripple our current system. Even
more importantly, this double dichotomy means that many qualified HCPs
cannot give safe and effective care to people who want and need their
services. We all pay a huge price for the consequences, measured in extra
real dollars spent on health care, in lack of access to qualified service-
providers, and in the constant antagonism among health care professionals
who should be working cooperatively to provide optimal care.
While no individual essay could possibly exhaust the topic, I believe
that a little history and a few well-chosen examples will go a long way in
assisting policymakers who find themselves caught up in these recurring,
scorched-earth debates over scope of practice. I hope, too, that this
approach will enable interested, reform-minded public consumers to better
understand the wastefulness of many current, overly restrictive laws. In the
following Parts, I will briefly describe the historical antecedents of our
current licensure laws, known as "practice acts," and demonstrate why turf
battles among HCP groups are inevitable whenever modifications are
proposed to existing scopes of practice. I will also review some examples
of legislation that exalts authority over ability, perpetuates the "physician-
only" paradigm, ignores the demonstrated competence of all other HCPs,
and thus demonstrates the dysfunctional, wasteful, and often absurd results
of the current scheme. Finally, I will suggest some principles that should
guide efforts to reform scope-of-practice laws and highlight two examples
of progressive licensure schemes that focus on shared abilities rather than
exclusive authority.
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I. How Did We Get Here? The Historical Context
To protect the public from potentially harmful health services
rendered by unqualified people, each state has enacted licensing laws, or
practice acts, governing most HCP groups. Typically, these laws do three
things: (1) They define the practice of the profession in question; (2) they
limit that practice to people who satisfactorily complete a specified
training regime and pass an examination; and (3) they restrict to license
holders both the use of the professional title or credentials and the
performance of the defined practice functions.
Across the country, physicians (also known as medical doctors or
"MDs") were the first HCPs to secure licensure. By the early-1900s, so-
called "medical practice acts" had been adopted in each state, and, being
first on the scene, physicians, perhaps understandably, swept the entire
human condition within their purview. In almost every state, their
legislatively-recognized scope of practice gave them exclusive domain
over "the practice of medicine."' The following medical practice act is
representative of the breath-taking range this includes:
Definition of practice of medicine -
A person is practicing medicine if he does one or more of the following:
(1) Offers or undertakes to diagnose, cure, advise or prescribe for any
human disease, ailment, injury, infirmity, deformity, pain or other
condition, physical or mental, real or imaginary, by any means or
instrumentality;
(2) Administers or prescribes drugs or medicinal preparations to be used
by any other person;
(3) Severs or penetrates the tissues of human beings;
(4) Uses on cards, books, papers, signs or other written or printed means
of giving information to the public, in the conduct of any occupation or
profession pertaining to the diagnosis or treatment of human disease or
conditions the designation "doctor or medicine," "physician," "surgeon,"
"m.d." or any combination thereof .... 3
(One element missing from this example, but common to many other
medical practice acts, is the provision that the actions in question must
have been undertaken for compensation. 4)
2 For an excellent description of the evolution of organized medicine's licensure activities
and an analysis of the resulting economic, cultural, political and social authority of physicians, see
PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 102-12 (1982).
3 WASH. REV. CODEANN. § 18.71.011 (West 2001).
4 See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4731.34(3)(a)-(b) (West 2001):
Vol. 19:301, 2002
Health-Care Providers' Scopes of Practice
Once medicine's scope of practice was thus comprehensively defined
in law, almost any activity directed at "health or sickness"---especially if
done for compensation-was deemed to be the practice of medicine.
Licensed physicians, then, had obtained what sociologist Eliot Freidson
has aptly characterized as "the exclusive right to practice."5 Having
obtained that right, physicians turned their attention to other HCPs who
were "useful to the physician and necessary to his practice, even if
dangerous to his monopoly."6 To meet the need and defuse the danger,
physicians obtained statutory authority to "control ... those occupations'
activities so as to limit what they could do and to supervise or direct their
activities."7 This authority to supervise or direct other HCPs, combined
with the authority to "delegate"8 medical procedures and tasks to non-
physicians, persists to this day. It underpins the legislative infrastructure
that continues to subvert even the best efforts to develop a rational,
effective scheme that promotes the highest and best use of all trained
HCPs.
But back to history for a moment. Under this skewed regime, even the
simplest of everyday health-care functions fell within the definition of
medical practice, so no one else could do them absent the supervision of,
or delegation by, a licensed physician. Only two or three decades ago,
even a registered professional nurse could not take blood pressure, start an
IV, or draw blood unless "ordered" to do so by a physician. Otherwise, the
nurse would be deemed to be practicing medicine (by "diagnosing" or
"penetrating the tissues of human beings") without a medical license.
Indeed, up until the mid- to late-1970s, only physicians (who were usually
medical students moonlighting in department stores) had the authority to
pierce ears for would-be earring wearers!9 Obviously, nurses and many
Examines or diagnoses for compensation of any kind, direct or indirect; (b)
Prescribes, advises, recommends, administers, or dispenses for compensation of
any kind, direct or indirect, a drug or medicine, appliance, mold or cast,
application, operation, or treatment, of whatever nature, for the cure or relief of a
wound, fracture or bodily injury, infirmity, or disease.




8 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 43-34-26(b)(9) (2001) ("Nothing in this chapter shall be
construed to prohibit: ... the delegation by a physician to a qualified person ... of any acts, duties, or
functions which are otherwise permitted by law or established by custom; and the performance of such
acts, duties, or functions by such a person .... ). For a general treatment of the "delegation of medical
acts," see Daniel. B. Hogan, The Effectiveness of Licensing: History, Evidence, and Recommendations,
7 LAW& HUM. BEHAV. 117 (1983).
9 See, e.g., 1979 Ohio Op. Att'y Gen. 79-002 (advising that "ear piercing does not
constitute the practice of medicine" under the medical practice act).
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other kinds of HCPs had the clinical ability to do these tasks safely; what
they lacked was the legal authority. 10
Over time, other HCP groups-both established (nurses, pharmacists,
optometrists, and nurse midwives) and emerging (nurse practitioners,
podiatrists, physical therapists, and clinical psychologists)-sought legal
recognition of their expertise and the corresponding authority to practice.
But they soon discovered that, legally speaking, they faced a totally pre-
empted field because the original medical practice acts defined medicine in
global, undifferentiated terms to include all diagnosing, treating,
prescribing, or curing. As a result, each of these other HCP groups was
relegated to a scope of practice that was by definition "carved out" of
medicine's universal domain. Typically, this carving-out was
accomplished by focusing on a single part of the body (e.g., podiatrists/feet
and dentists/teeth) or on one small subset of functions pertaining to a body
part (e.g., optometrists/corrective lens). Even providers whose professional
training embraced the health of the "whole person," such as nurses, could
avoid the preemption problem only by resorting to creative word-games-
by referring to nursing "assessments"" rather than "diagnoses," for
example, or by "furnishing" rather than "prescribing" drugs. And even
these small, artificially constrained scope-of-practice niches were usually
achieved only after organized medicine had secured legislatively-
mandated physician referral or supervision requirements.
This, then, is the history of our current scope-of-practice regime, and it
makes clear the immense importance of these historical artifacts: the
pervasive medical practice acts that remain on the books in every state.
These acts are the "dark matter" of the health-care universe, not often seen
or thought about, yet exerting a gravitational force that continues to skew
all attempts to modify non-physician scopes of practice. If everything is
medicine by legal definition, physicians have no need to amend their own
practice acts to allow for new treatments or newly established sub-
specialties. At the same time, other HCPs (sometimes known as "non-
physician providers" or "physician extenders," two phrases that neatly
capture the whole irrational dynamic' 2) are repeatedly forced to ask their
legislators to "reopen" their scope-of-practice laws, with all of the
10 1 have described elsewhere the development of the regulation of professional nurses,
moving from early "registration-only" laws, to dependent practice "as prescribed by a licensed
physician," to more independent practice parameters based on nursing judgment, skill, and techniques.
See Barbara J. Safriet, Health Care Dollars and Regulatory Sense: The Role of Advanced Practice
Nursing, 9 YALE J. ON REG. 417, 442-45 (1992), and sources cited therein.
11 Hence, the common practice of a nurse saying, "The patient appears dead," an
assessment, rather than saying, "The patient is dead," a diagnosis.
12 The use of "non-physician providers" and other similar terms, to describe a wide array of
professional health care providers has very real consequences. In addition to lumping together several
distinct professionals in a totally undifferentiated way, the terms strongly reinforce the normative
status of the physician-there is the physician, and then there are the non-physician "others."
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attendant risk and expense, in order to obtain legal authority to deploy the
expanded abilities they have gained from ever-more-sophisticated
education and training. The inter-professional conflict that inevitably
results from this imbalance has been described succinctly by the Pew
Taskforce on Health Care Workforce Regulation:
Due to different educational and regulatory histories, the various
professions are uniquely situated and view regulation and potential
changes differently. Medicine is the only profession with state practice
acts that cover all of health care services. With this exclusivity, little or
nothing exists that can be added to the medical act and medicine has no
incentive to delete anything. From this position, medicine can see every
request for regulatory change from any other profession or occupation as
a challenge or confrontation. With all-inclusive practice authority, the
profession also has the credentials, expertise and political influence to
comment on potential impacts of changed laws on patients, clients and
13consumers.
To understand that organized medicine perceives physicians' legal
prerogatives to be both exclusive and inviolate, one need only review the
official statements of the largest national medical organization, the
American Medical Association ("AMA"). In response to legislative efforts
to expand the scopes of practice for some HCPs and allow them to be paid
directly, for example, the AMA has adopted several resolutions which
direct the organization to
* "oppose[] enactment of legislation to authorize the independent
practice of medicine by any individual who has not completed the
state's requirement '' 14 for medical licensure,
* "oppose any attempt at empowering nonphysicians to become
unsupervised primary medical care providers and be directly
reimbursed ... "" and
* "support[] medical doctors against efforts advanced by alternative
providers seeking increased medical control of patients by
legislatively expanding their scopes of practice without physician
direction and state boards of medical examiners oversight.,
16
13 TAsKFORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 23.
14 Am. Med. Ass'n, H.D. Res. H-35.988 (1982).
15 AM. MED. ASS'N, Independent Nursing Practice Models, PROCEEDINGS OF THE HouSE
OF DELEGATES 141, 152 (1990).
16 Prepared Statement ofJan Stewart CRNA, ARNP on Behalf of the American Association
of Nurse Anesthetists Before the House Judiciary Committee, FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, June 22, 1999;
see also Am. Med. Ass'n, H.D. Res. H-160.947 (2000).
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These policies, which are "to be pursued through all appropriate legislative
and other advocacy activities,"" sanction self-styled "see bill, kill bill"
strategies and "scope-of-practice firefights"' 8  to keep others from
"encroach[ing]" upon or "stray[ing]" into the realm of medicine. 9 In short,
"AMA delegates consider the matter akin to war and are fighting back.
'" 20
This point of view will not be unfamiliar to the countless legislators
and agency staff members who have repeatedly heard organized
medicine's most consistent argument against expanding the scope of
practice for any other providers: "That's the practice of medicine,''" and
"only we can do it."'22 "If you want to do it, go to medical school., 23 As I
have noted elsewhere: "[S]uch comments are both deeply troubling and
instructive because they bespeak both professional self-interest and a
profound misapprehension of the issue. No one would deny that people
who wish to practice medicine should go to medical school. Rather ....
the question is exactly what the practice of medicine, and what it is not."
Or, put more precisely, the question is what is exclusively24 the
practice of medicine and what is not, because those activities "carved out"
by various HCP groups do not thereby vanish from physicians' all-
encompassing scope of practice. Many things that are, by definition, the
practice of medicine are also--in fact and in law-the practice of
17 Am. Med. Ass'n, H.D. Res. H-360.988 (2000).
18 Jay Greene, Physician Groups Brace for Allied Incursion, AM. MED. NEWS, Dec. 11,
2000, at 1.
19 Jay Greene, AMA To Fight Nonphysician Scope of Practice Expansions, AM. MED.
NEWS, Jan. 3/10, 2000, at 8.
20 LaCrisha Buttle, Nonphysicians Gain Clout, AM. MED. NEWS, Jan. 17, 2000, at 1, 26.
21 See, e.g., Am. Soc'y of Anesthesiologists, HCFA Publishes Proposed Hospital
Conditions Eliminating Nurse Anesthetist Supervision Rule, PRESIDENT'S UPDATE, Dec. 31, 1997, at 1,
3 (statement of former American Society of Anesthesiologists President William Owens) ("Either the
practice of anesthesiology is the practice of medicine or it is not."). But see, Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. JC-
0117 (1999) ("The Board of Nurse Examiners may regulate the selection and administration of
anesthesia and the maintenance of anesthetized patients by certified registered nurse
anesthetists .... ).
22 See, e.g., Am. Med. Ass'n, H.D. Res. 216 (1998) ("Resolved, [1.] That anesthesiology is
the practice of medicine. [and 2.] That the American Medical Association seek legislation to establish
the principle in federal and state law and regulation that anesthesia care requires the personal
performance or supervision by an appropriately licensed and credentialed doctor of medicine,
osteopathy, or dentistry.").
23 See, e.g., Am. Med. Ass'n, supra note 16. ("Many health care workers seek to legislate
their ability to practice medicine, rather than obtain a high level of expertise and competence through
medical school education and training ....").
24 See, e.g., David M. Mirvis, Sounding Board: Physicians' Autonomy-The Relation
Between Public and Professional Expectations, 328 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1346, 1347 (1993):
[Nurses, clinical pharmacists, and other allied health professionals are now
educated and trained to perform many tasks previously assigned only to
physicians. In these areas, physicians have a right to autonomy because of their
knowledge, but it is not an exclusive right. Instead, it is a right to be shared with
other appropriately credentialed professionals.
(emphasis added).
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optometry, or nursing, or clinical psychology, or .... Properly understood,
this is a regulatory train wreck in the making.
II. Where Are We? Current Problems Resulting from Medicine's
Legislative Preemption
Many detrimental consequences flow directly and inevitably from the
historical antecedents and present-day realities I have described. The most
obvious is the built-in inter-professional conflict cum playground
argument--"it can't be yours because it's mine"-but there are many
more. They, too, arise from the disjunction between legally recognized
authority and clinical competence in providers' scopes of practice.
As is abundantly clear from the illustrative medical practice act
quoted above, physicians' legally defined scope of practice is overly
inclusive. It is undifferentiated, universal, and timeless, so a licensed
medical doctor is authorized to undertake virtually any kind of medical or
health intervention. For example, an MD may practice gynecology,
oncology, orthopedics, pediatrics, retinal surgery, or psychiatry on
alternating days, through treatment modalities that are decades old or were
invented yesterday-all under the same generic medical license he
obtained years ago. Of course, the vast majority of physicians do not and
would not engage in such unfettered practice, but it is not the law that
constrains them. The medical practice acts speak only of medicine; they do
not limit individuals to any sub-parts or specialties2 5 or require any
subsequent demonstration of competence as new treatments arrive on the
scene. Rather, it is a combination of generally effective, extralegal
constraints that limits physicians to only those areas of practice in which
they know they are qualified. These constraints include common sense and
decency, professional judgment, professional ethics,26  institutional
credentialing systems, voluntary accreditation standards, malpractice
insurance restrictions and conditions, and, more recently, a better-informed
patient cohort. In sum, it is self-restraint, rather than lack of authority, that
keeps physicians from practicing beyond the bounds of their abilities.
The scope-of-practice situation of other HCPs is a mirror image of
that of physicians. Where medical practice acts are too inclusive, almost
all other kinds of licensed providers must contend with overly restrictive
25 See, e.g., Conn. State Med. Soc'y v. Conn. Bd. of Exam'rs in Podiatry, 546 A.2d 830,
837 (Conn. 1988) (noting the "marked contrast" between the podiatry statutes which "authorize the
practice of podiatry and define its limits" and the medicine and surgery statutes "wherein the scope of
practice of medicine and surgery is not defined").
26 See, e.g., AM. MED. ASS'N, PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS (June 2001), available at
http://www.ama-assn.org ("A physician shall be dedicated to providing competent medical care," and
"[a] physician shall uphold the standards of professionalism."). One assumes that knowingly practicing
beyond the bounds of one's training and knowledge would violate one or both of these principles.
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scope-of-practice laws. These providers are not limited by ability, for they
have not yet been permitted to approach, much less exceed, the bounds of
their competence. Instead, they are limited by authority--or, more
precisely, by the lack of it. Health care-related knowledge continues to
expand as research yields new inventions and improves old ones. And just
as physicians' skills have evolved as a consequence, so too have those of
other providers.2 7  Yet, when these other professionals seek a
corresponding expansion of their legal authority, as reflected in their
statutorily defined scopes of practice, they are stymied by both the inertia
of the legislative process and the medical-preemption dynamic described
earlier. As a result, what they are able to do is always several years (or
more) ahead of what they are permitted to do. The sum total of wasted
professional assets represented by this disparity is staggering-and
growing.
Another legal problem intrinsic to overly restrictive scope-of-practice
laws borders on the absurd: How are providers to achieve expanded scopes
of practice by demonstrating that they can safely and effectively do what
they are not yet authorized to do? Few would be willing to follow the
obvious but perilous path of demonstrating that they have competently
done something that is clearly beyond the scope of their current legal
authority. This conundrum is especially acute when the asked-for
expansion would eliminate mandatory physician supervision or direction.
No matter how well-educated or capable of independent practice, the
provider in such a situation is likely to encounter a predictable response
from organized medicine to any study data mustered as evidence: "Since
the data must reflect legally 'supervised' practices, they prove nothing
27 The expanded professional education and clinical abilities of pharmacists are illustrative
of the increased knowledge domains of health care providers. In 1992, the American Association of
Colleges of Pharmacy voted to make the transition from the Bachelor of Science in Pharmacy to the
Doctor of Pharmacy ("Pharm.D.") as the entry-level professional degree. After 2003, the American
Council of Pharmaceutical Education will only accredit Pharm.D. programs. The Pharm.D. requires
four years of professional study (including at least two semesters of supervised clinical experience),
following at least two years of college-level pre-pharmacy study. With their increased training,
pharmacists are qualified to take on new roles, including drug monitoring and disease management for
defined conditions (such as diabetes, asthma, and anti-coagulant therapy), as well as collaboration with
clinical care teams, research on health outcomes, and participation in drug utilization review programs.
As a study by the U.S. Health Resources and Services Administration has noted,
Through [disease management] programs and with physician collaboration,
pharmacists can provide a range of services including assessing the patient,
ordering drug-therapy related laboratory tests, administering drugs, and selecting,
monitoring, and adjusting medication regimens. These programs usually involve a
series of regularly scheduled visits with the pharmacist and often follow disease-
specific management guidelines.
BUREAU OF HEALTH PROFESSIONS, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, THE
PHARMACIST WORKFORCE: A STUDY OF THE SUPPLY AND DEMAND FOR PHARMACISTS 34 (2000),
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with respect to your capacity to practice safely and effectively on your
own license."
Of course, as detailed in the Pew Taskforce Report,28 there are ways
to overcome this legal catch-22. HCP groups may offer evidence from
other states and practice settings (such as military and veterans' health
systems29) where the requisite legal authorization for independent practice
already exists, and legislatures may sanction special demonstration and
information-gathering projects. But, while these approaches are helpful,
they too are vulnerable to irrational argument and political manipulation.
A history of safe and effective practice in another jurisdiction, for
example, will sometimes be dismissed by opponents of change as
inapposite and irrelevant; the simple argument that "we do things
differently in this state" appeals simultaneously to the high-minded public-
spiritedness of some legislators and the regional chauvinism of others. In
addition, of course, special projects to gather information or demonstrate
competence are costly to the groups involved-first, in the effort to gain
legislative permission in the face of well-coordinated opposition and, later,
in the effort to complete the projects successfully.
Another ubiquitous problem, both within and among states, is the
seemingly endless variation in the scopes of practice governing providers
other than physicians. This diversity, too, is a direct result of the ad hoc,
profession-by-profession carving-out process described earlier, and it is
exacerbated by the American tradition of looking to the states to regulate
HCPs. Every state licenses a growing array of provider groups, and the
legislative recognition afforded each of them varies enormously in its
timing and expansiveness. And this is so, notwithstanding the existence of
28 See TASKFORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 25-33, 48-53.
29 A recent (and pathbreaking) example of state legislation, influenced in part by a U.S.
Department of Defense pilot program, grants clinical psychologists prescriptive authority as of July 1,
2002. New Mexico House Bill 170, 2002 N.M. Laws 100, grants doctorally trained psychologists who
have additional pharmacological training and who have passed a national certification examination on
pharmacology in the diagnosis, care, and treatment of mental disorders the right to apply for a two-year
"conditional prescription certificate." Under the terms of the conditional certificate, the psychologists
may prescribe psychotropic medication, but only under the supervision of a licensed physician. After
the successful completion of two years of prescribing psychotropic medications, as certified by the
supervising physician, the psychologists can renew the conditional certificate, or apply for a
"prescription certificate," which allows psychologists to prescribe psychotropic medications without
physician supervision. Under both certificates, the psychologist must "maintain an ongoing
collaborative relationship [defined as 'a cooperative working relationship'] with the health care
practitioner [physician, osteopathic physician, or nurse practitioner] who oversees the patient's general
medical care." While many implementing details (including guidelines to be jointly established by the
Board of Psychology Examiners and the Board of Medical Examiners) remain to be finalized, this
legislation is noteworthy for at least three reasons: (1) It is the first state legislation granting
psychologists authority to prescribe drugs for mental health care; (2) it provides for a legislatively-
recognized continuum from supervised to independent practice; and (3) it properly distinguishes
between supervision and collaboration, the latter being a desired goal for all health care providers,
including physicians. See also Erica Goode, Psychologists Get Prescription Pads and Furor Erupts,
N.Y. TiMES, Mar. 26, 2002, at F1.
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national educational accreditation standards, not to mention national
licensure or certification examinations, all of which, one might have
thought, should suffice to signal common abilities and competencies
across state lines. The net result is a regulatory patchwork in which two
providers who have completed the same educational program and passed
the same licensure examination, and who now treat the same kinds of
patients and conditions, are nevertheless subject to very different scopes of
practice. Provider One in state A, say, is restricted to a dependent practice
in which he must be "supervised" or "directed"30 by an on-site physician,
with no authority to prescribe even the most commonly indicated drugs
and no way to get paid for his services other than indirectly, through the
physician. Provider Two in state B, however, may independently diagnose,
treat, and prescribe over-the-counter, legend and controlled schedule
drugs, with hospital admitting privileges and direct reimbursement from
third-party payers.
While one might attribute these seemingly irrational disparities solely
to the state-based licensure system, that justification evaporates when one
considers the large scope-of-practice variations within states. Intriguingly,
a provider's legal authority (though, presumably, not ability) within a
single state will sometimes shift along three axes: (1) the geographic
location of the practice (e.g., rural areas, inner cities, or other places where
there is a dearth of HCPs), (2) the type of patients treated (e.g., persons
eighteen years of age or older, individuals who are unable to receive
regular health services, or the home-bound), and (3) the financial or
institutional nature of the practice setting (e.g., long-term care facilities,
school-based health clinics, nursing homes, correctional facilities, nursery
schools, mental health residential facilities, or adult foster homes).31 While
these scope-of-practice distinctions are doubtlessly designed to facilitate
access to quality care for disadvantaged people, such rampant variations
amount to a distortion of the licensure laws, which are simply supposed to
inform the public about who is competent to do what. Instead, the logic of
these intra-state distinctions leads ineluctably in one of two directions: If a
duly licensed HCP has authority to do something in the inner city but not
in the wealthier suburbs, she is either practicing beyond the boundaries of
her competence in the first situation or is being artificially and foolishly
constrained in the second for reasons having nothing to do with her ability.
A provider's governmentally assessed and certified clinical competence
30 For a discussion of the detrimental effects of supervision or direction requirements, see
William M. Sage & Linda H. Aiken, Regulating Interdisciplinary Practice, in REGULATION OF THE
HEALTHCARE PROFESSIONS 71, 77 (Timothy S. Jost ed., 1997) ("The effects of these provisions vary
widely. Many are largely ignored in practice, while others merely increase costs to patients through
higher overhead or explicit billing of supervisory services to payors.").
31 For examples of legislation specifying practice authority by reference to the nature of the
practice site, see NORRIS, supra note 1.
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cannot in fact-and should not in law-fluctuate depending upon her
location on one side or the other of an imaginary line or upon the corporate
structure of the practice setting.
It seems incontestable that these mismatches between ability and
authority cause confusion, unfairness, and significant waste,32 even within
individual states. The problems grow exponentially, however, when two or
more state practice acts collide. There are, of course, obvious disincentives
to interstate mobility for individual HCPs; no matter how attractive such a
move might otherwise be, few would eagerly relocate to a state where their
professional ambit would be drastically reduced by a crabbed scope-of-
practice law.33 In addition, the crazy quilt of licensure laws has repeatedly
been identified as the greatest legal impediment to "telepractice" or
"telehealth" systems that would allow HCPs to monitor, diagnose, and
treat patients at distant sites through telecommunications technology. 34 The
unrealized potential of these systems provides a remarkably revealing
example of the ways in which conflicting scope-of-practice laws stifle the
promise of new technologies and practice modes, thus denying consumers
32 For example, even though a nurse practitioner ("NP") is fully trained and able to
diagnose, treat and prescribe for a wide range of primary and secondary conditions, a restrictive
practice act and restrictive federal reimbursement conditions could force the NP to have to "refer" the
patient to a physician for a duplicate examination or have the physician "sign" the prescription which
the NP appropriately had selected. This process results in needless costs, increased inconvenience for
the patient, and redundant utilization of skilled clinicians' time.
A pervasive federal reimbursement scheme for Medicare limits payment for NPs' services
"incident to" a physician's services to treatments of only those conditions initially diagnosed by a
physician. If, then, during a follow-up visit for treatment by the NP, the NP diagnoses an additional
condition, no treatment can be given and billed to the government until the patient is yet again seen
and diagnosed by the physician. And this applies to the most common of ailments, like "pink eye" or
upper respiratory tract infections. This limitation results in needless time spent by the providers and the
patient, and it also produces a serious potential for good-faith, but faulty, billing, thus triggering false
claims scrutiny by the federal government. 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(s)(2)(A)-(B) (2000). For a
comprehensive analysis of "incident to" and other compensation difficulties faced by "nonphysician"
providers, see Alice G. Gosfield, Highest and Best Use: Nonphysician Practitioners and Physicians
Under Medicare, in HEALTH LAW HANDBOOK 89 (Alice G. Gosfield ed., 1999).
33 For studies demonstrating a positive correlation between the number of practitioners in a
jurisdiction and the progressivity of a state's practice laws, see Carol S. Weissert, The Political Context
of State Regulation of the Health Professions, in THE U.S. HEALTH WORKFORCE 81, 87 (Marian
Osterweis et al. eds., 1996) (citing Edward S. Sekscenski et al., State Practice Environments and the
Supply of Physician Assistants, Nurse Practitioners, and Certified Nurse-Midwives, 331 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 1266 (1994)). Also, see TIM HENDERSON & TERESA CHOVAN, INTERGOVERNMENTAL HEALTH
POLICY PROJECT, REMOVING PRACTICE BARRIERS OF NONPHYSICIAN PROVIDERS (1994), for an
analysis of the negative effects that restrictive legal and regulatory provisions have on access to
primary care provided by "nonphysician" providers.
34 See generally TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T
OF COMMERCE, TELEMEDICINE REPORT TO THE CONGRESS (1997), available at
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/telemed (last visited Apr. 28, 2002); U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
TELEMEDICINE: FEDERAL STRATEGY Is NEEDED TO GUIDE INVESTMENTS (1997), available at
http://www.gao.gov/archive/1997/n397067.pdf (last visited Apr. 28, 2002); S.S. Huie, Facilitating
Telemedicine: Reconciling National Access with State Licensing Laws, 18 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT.
L.J. 377 (1996); Wendi Johnson et al., Telemedicine: Diagnosing the Legal Issues, in HEALTH LAW
HANDBOOK 55 (Alice G. Gosfield ed., 2001).
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improved access to high-quality health care at a reduced cost. As matters
now stand, a full-fledged telehealth system would remain largely idle even
if the requisite financial and technical infrastructure were already in place,
thanks to the regulatory nightmares engendered by multiple and
conflicting licensure laws.
These, then, are the most pernicious aspects of the scope-of-practice
laws currently in effect. For historical, rather than logical, reasons,
physicians enjoy an overly expansive scope of practice, while all other
HCPs are overly restricted. In recent years, these flaws have been steadily
compounded by the proliferation of different practice laws in different
states, and varying scope-of-practice provisions within states. The
scientific underpinnings of the health disciplines do not change with
political boundaries, nor does the capacity of individuals to learn and to act
upon that knowledge. The only thing that changes is the authority
conferred or withheld by each jurisdiction.
When thus stripped down to its essence, this state of affairs seems
indefensible. Indeed, it calls into question the very purposes of licensing
and regulation. How does this jumble of conflicting and restrictive laws
really protect the public from harm? If it occasionally manages to do so, it
is in the manner of a blunderbuss destroying a gnat: a hugely inefficient
means to the end, and one that inflicts great collateral damage. But when
one looks at the system through a different pair of glasses, the picture
becomes clearer. Without attributing malice or bad faith to any of the
individual actors in the drama, one can discern how the forces of history
have combined with those of the legislative process and the predictable
self-interest of the first organized group on the scene to protect the latter's
professional autonomy, exclusivity, status, income, and control. As one
legal commentator noted after serving for five years as a public member of
a state medical board:
In my experience, regulation has too often served the profession first and
the public second or not at all. It has enforced orthodoxy and slowed
innovation more often than protecting the public....
I can't imagine the hours I have spent listening intently to the
differences between the ophthalmologist and the optometrists, or ... to
the turf battles between the various branches of medicine or nursing.
Looking back on it, few of these arguments had anything to do with
competency or public safety. It was monopoly and money and not safety
and skill that usually were at stake.
35
35 JOST, supra note 30, at viii; see also Sue A. Blevins, Cato Institute, The Medical
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This is undeniably a damning characterization. But it is, alas, substantiated
by numerous statutes and regulations that do, in fact, transparently protect
professional control (and income) with little or no focus on public
protection.36 Consider the following illustrations.
III. Scope-of-Practice Regulation in Action: A Few Examples
In 1992, the Georgia legislature enacted a statute,
prohibit[ing] persons other than doctors, dentists, podiatrists, and
veterinarians from performing any surgery, operation, or invasive
procedure in which human or animal tissue is cut, pierced or otherwise
altered by the use of any mechanical means, laser, ionizing radiation,
medication administered by injection, or the removal of foreign bodies
from within the tissues of the eye.37
Violation of the statute constituted a felony, punishable by a fine of
between $500 and $1,000, or imprisonment from two to five years, or
both.3 8 The public need for and purpose of this provision were not readily
apparent, to say the least. But the statute would have, among its many
ramifications, mooted then-circulating proposals to increase the scope of
practice of optometrists and advanced practice nurses. (It would also, by
the way, have criminalized the legislators' later consumption of their
chicken dinners.)
In expedited court proceedings39 involving the Georgia Medical,
Nursing and Optometric Associations and the Georgia Attorney General,
the statute was declared unconstitutional for failing to meet even the most
minimal requirements of due process and equal protection. As the Georgia
Supreme Court noted:
All parties concede that the literal language of § 43-34-1 violates due
process and equal protection in that it is so broad that it prohibits much
conduct that there is no rational basis to prohibit . . . . including the
administering of shots by nurses, the self-injection of insulin by a
36 For a succinct essay questioning the public-spiritedness of the health care licensing
scheme, see Blevins, supra note 35, at 1. Judge Richard Posner, in a case reviewing an Illinois statute
which prohibited psychologists from being included in hospital medical staffs, also stated, "[T]here is
now a large body of scholarly literature which questions the wisdom of occupational licensure ....
The scholars have found that governmental restrictions on the professions create barriers to entry,
reduce competition, and raise professional incomes, without bringing about compensating increases in
the quality of professional services." I1l. Psych. Ass'n v. Falk, 818 F.2d 1337, 1341 (7th Cir. 1987).
37 Miller v. Medical Ass'n of Ga., 423 S.E.2d. 664 (Ga. 1992) (citing GA. CODE ANN. § 43-
34-46 (200 1)).
38 § 43-34-46.
39 Miller, 423 S.E.2d at 664.
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diabetic, the drawing of blood, the piercing of ears, embalming, and the
tattooing of skin, to name a few.4°
Despite arguments by the Medical Association of Georgia, the court
refused to craft a narrowing interpretation, finding that "the statute is so
wide-ranging in its impact that we cannot possibly make one interpretation
of the statute that we would be certain would render it constitutional and
effectuate the legislative intent in enacting the statute."4' This last
observation necessarily draws into question the real purpose of the law-
Had the court been able to identify any credible public safety rationale, it
would not have been forced to rule out the possibility of reconciling the
statute with minimal constitutional standards.
In contrast to the Georgia statute, which was clearly designed to limit
even the most everyday practices to physicians alone, Ohio recently
enacted a law 42 whose purpose was "to open up the market for patients
who want to use acupuncture as complementary or alternative medicine. ' 3
(Before this time, not surprisingly, acupuncture had been the sole province
of those licensed to practice medicine or podiatry. 44) The new law tellingly
attempts to blend innovative thinking with the deference historically
accorded to medicine. It
* defines acupuncture,
* prohibits anyone other than a physician or acupuncture student
from practicing acupuncture without a valid certificate of
registration issued by the state medical board,
• limits the issuance of such certificates to people designated as
Diplomats in Acupuncture by the National Certification
Commission for Acupuncture and Oriental Medicine, and
* authorizes an acupuncturist to practice only under the general
supervision of a physician who has made a written referral or
prescription setting out the conditions or restrictions to be placed
on the course of treatment.
Compared to what went before, this law is a vast improvement. It
expands the universe of providers who may perform acupuncture and
40 Id. at 665.
41 Id. (emphasis in original).
42 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4762.01-4762.99 (West 2000).
43 Linda Lou, Opening Paths for Acupuncture: More Therapists Now Licensed to Treat a
Wider Variety of Ills, THE PLAIN DEALER, July 30, 2001, at El (quoting Bill sponsor, Representative
Kirk Shilling).
44 See State v. Rich, 339 N.E.2d 630, 632 (Ohio 1975) ("[T]he insertion of needles beneath
the skin to alleviate pain, infirmity, or disease, commonly known as acupuncture, constitutes the
practice of medicine within the meaning of [the medical practice act].").
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protects the public by conferring the legal authority to practice on only
properly trained professionals. But a careful re-reading of the statute
reveals one glaring exception-physicians. The law explicitly exempts
45
physicians from having to demonstrate their competence in acupuncture as
a condition of their authority to practice it. Yet, it allows nationally
certified acupuncturists to practice only under the supervision of a
physician, who need have no expertise whatsoever.
This scheme is truly remarkable in its exaltation of authority over
ability. In their defense, we may surmise that the Ohio legislators assumed
the requisite knowledge and expertise on the part of physicians, since
acupuncture had always fallen within the broad statutory definition of
"medicine." But any such assumption would be baseless in Ohio as
elsewhere, because acupuncture is neither a standard part of medical
school curricula, nor one of the subjects included in national medical
licensing examinations. Furthermore, it is clear that the legislature did not
assume such universal competence when it came to money: While all
physicians are permitted to "supervise" acupuncturists to whom they refer
patients, they are eligible for workers' compensation reimbursement for
such referrals "only if the physician has attained knowledge in the
treatment of patients with acupuncture, demonstrated by successful
completion of a course of study in acupuncture ....
While this statute promotes the laudable goal of increasing public
access to, and choice among, well-trained HCPs, it also illustrates several
common pitfalls in the regulation of providers. To begin with, it vividly
demonstrates the sometimes-absurd results that flow from a lack of
congruence between HCPs' demonstrated ability and legal authority.
Further, like the many statutes of which it is typical, it reinforces the
supposed universality of "medicine" as defined by legislatures-a
universality contravened by both everyday practice and common sense.
Finally, statutes like this one perpetuate the professional ascendancy of
medicine by legally enforcing physicians' dominance over all other HCPs.
In Ohio, the public interest was undeniably served by the requirement that
acupuncturists be demonstrably competent. It seems fair to suppose,
however, that another purpose altogether was served by the additional
provisions conferring supervisory authority on physicians while excusing
them from even the most cursory requirement that they prove their own
competence in acupuncture.
There are many other examples of what can happen when the law
fails to distinguish between practice authority and clinical ability. One of
them-podiatry-provides an especially vivid illustration of the almost-
45 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4762.02 (West 2000) ("Certificate of Registration; Exemptions,
(B) ... this section does not apply to a physician ....").
46 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4762.12 (West 2000).
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comical extreme to which the logic of our current regulatory regime can
lead. Podiatric physicians, originally known as chiropodists, are typically
governed by practice acts defining the practice of podiatric medicine and
surgery as "the diagnosis and the medical, surgical, mechanical,
manipulative, and electrical treatment of ailments of the human foot.
47
This includes the authority to administer and prescribe drugs, and to use
local anesthesia. Amputation of the toes and parts of the foot is usually
permitted, but amputation of the entire foot is not.48
In the absence of further clarification, however, the legal question
becomes: "what is a foot?" Does it include the ankle, or those tissues,
ligaments and tendons connecting the ankle and the foot, or those leg
bones (the tibia and the fibula) that terminate at the ankle or foot? This
definitional question and the supplemental question of who decides it-the
legislature, the podiatry or medical board, or the courts-have provoked a
good deal of costly and time-consuming controversy. While the arguments
sometimes seem to echo the old song about how "the leg bone is
connected to the thigh bone," the resulting determinations have significant
practical consequences for podiatrists.
According to the American Podiatric Medical Association, the foot is
"a complex structure made up of 26 bones, [33] joints, 107 ligaments, and
19 muscles and tendons, 49 and podiatric medicine involves "practice on
the lower extremities, primarily the feet and ankles."5 ° The association
further notes that "podiatric physicians are licensed . . . to treat the foot
and its related or governing structures ... [and] the vast majority of states
also include ankle care as part of the podiatric physician's scope of
practice."'" These statements by the professional association are both clear
and descriptive; however, even they introduce additional ambiguities such
as "related or governing structures" and "lower extremities." It is easy
enough to understand why a professional association would so describe its
own practice, because all professions would prefer to leave room for
procedures and treatments arising out of expanded abilities. The more
troublesome fact, for purposes of this Essay, is that these statements are no
more obscure than many to be found in official podiatric practice acts.
47 WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 18.22.035(2) (West 2001).
48 See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. § 12-32-101(3)(b) (2001) ("The 'practice of podiatry' does
not include the amputation of the foot or the administration of an anesthetic other than a local
anesthetic.").
49 Am. Podiatric Med. Ass'n, Highlights, at http://www.apma.org (last visited Apr. 8,
2002).
50 Am. Podiatric Med. Ass'n, About the Association, at http://www.apma.org/about.html
(last visited Apr. 8, 2002).
51 Am. Podiatric Med. Ass'n, Podiatric Medicine: The Physician, The Profession, the
Practice, at http://www.apma.org/podiat.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2002).
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Several podiatry acts authorize diagnosis and treatment of "ailments
of the human foot," without defining what is meant by the foot.52
Unfortunately, however, any scope-of-practice regime that revolves
around anatomical real estate rather than professional ability requires a
degree of legislative specificity that is unlikely to be forthcoming, for
reasons of both expertise (or lack of it) and politics. As a result, the task of
articulating such anatomical definitions is thrust upon administrative
agencies and courts.
The resulting processes and conclusions are seldom tidy or consistent.
Most often, these issues arise when medical associations challenge the
authority of podiatry boards to "fill in the gaps" by issuing rules53 or
declaratory orders setting forth what treatments are included within
podiatry's scope of practice. Alternatively, these issues sometimes arise in
malpractice cases centering on the question of whether a podiatrist's
treatment of the ankle is outside the scope of practice and therefore
constitutes negligence per se.
The agencies and courts that have grappled with these issues have
been faced with a dual interpretive challenge: First, what is a foot? Second,
is that determination a matter of law or of fact, and pursuant to a common
or a specialized understanding? Two cases are illustrative. 4 In the first, the
podiatry board of Connecticut had ruled that "the ankle is part of the foot,
and the foot is part of the ankle,"55 relying upon a requested attorney
general's opinion that "whether the ankle is ... part of the foot, or vice-
versa" 56 was an issue of fact best decided by the board. Having thereafter
determined (presumably as a matter of fact) that "the ankle and foot are
inseparable, 57 and that the term "foot" had a technical or anatomical
meaning, the board concluded that podiatrists' scope of practice included
treatment of the ankle. Upon review, however, the Connecticut Supreme
Court disagreed, looking instead to the "well accepted and common
meaning" of the term "foot," reflected in basic English dictionaries, as that
portion of the anatomy which falls "below the ankle joint."58 Under this
analysis, the Court determined that the board had no special expertise
52 See, e.g., TEX. STAT. CODE ANN. § 202.001(a)(4) (Vernon 2001); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 18.22.035(2) (West 2001).
53 See, e.g., Bd. of Podiatric Med. v. Fla. Med. Ass'n, 779 So. 2d 658, 660 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2001) (upholding a Board rule defining the statutory term "leg" to mean "the entire lower
extremity, extending from the head of the femur to the foot, but does not include the hip joint").
54 Conn. State Med. Soc'y v. Conn. Bd. of Exam'rs in Podiatry, 546 A.2d 830 (Conn.
1988); Tenn. Med. Ass'n v. Bd. of Registration in Podiatry, 907 S.W.2d 820 (Tenn. 1995).
55 Conn. State Med. Soc ', 546 A.2d at 831 n.2.
56 Id. at 831.
57 Id. at 837 n.7.
58 Compare Op. Tex. Atty. Gen. No. JC-0441, 2001 WL 1635277 (Dec. 17, 2001) (reaching
the same conclusion that the Texas Podiatry Board exceeded its authority in issuing a rule that defined
"foot" to include "the tibia and fibula in their articulation with the talus" but deeming the term "foot"
to have acquired a "technical meaning" rather a common meaning. (emphasis added)).
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which required judicial deference,59 and it concluded that the board had
contravened the legislature's intent by effectively expanding podiatry's
scope of practice.
A Tennessee court reached a similar conclusion, finding both that the
podiatry board's declaratory order (that treatment of structures adjacent to
the foot was within the definition of podiatry) was not supported by
substantial and material evidence, and that the board had exceeded its
authority in attempting to expand the scope of podiatry.60 In reviewing
what one judge characterized as "a confused state of affairs, '61 the court
pointed out several examples of "inconsistent and contradictory" reasoning
by the board, noting that
" "the ankle cannot be part of the foot if the foot is below the
ankle,, 62 and
* "if the structures connect the foot with another structure, they
obviously cannot be entirely within the substance of the foot,
63
and
* "the ankle cannot be both a part of the foot and an adjacent
structure."64
The accuracy (and, perhaps, profundity) of these statements by the court is
not the issue. Rather, that there was a situation in which it was reasonably
appropriate, and perhaps even necessary, to make them demonstrates the
absurdity of the underlying legal scheme. In this case and the Connecticut
case, the courts focused on parsing body parts as legal, factual, or mixed
law-and-fact questions, and both courts deemed irrelevant evidence
introduced in the boards' proceedings which demonstrated that podiatrists
had long been treating ankle sprains in both states. While this disregard of
evidence of clinical practice and ability was perhaps appropriate for
judicial review of these particular administrative actions,65 such legal
59 But see Jaramillo v. Morris, 750 P.2d 1301, 1306 (Wash. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that the
term "foot" was ambiguous, and therefore the Podiatry Board's declaratory ruling interpreting
treatment of the foot to include surgery on the ends of the tibia and fibula was entitled to "considerable
judicial deference").
60 Subsequent legislative amendments to the Podiatry Act indicated that the Tennessee
legislature concurred with the board's, and not the court's, interpretation of the scope of practice, as
the definition of podiatry was expanded to include treatment of "the human foot, ankle and soft tissue
structures ... " including "Achilles tendon repair." TENN. CODE ANN. § 63-3-101 (a) (2000).
61 See Tenn. Med. Ass'n v. Bd. of Registration in Podiatry, 907 S.W.2d 820 (Tenn. 1995)
(Todd, J., concurring).
62 Id. at 822.
63 Id. at 823.
64 Id.
65 But see Jaramillo v. Morris, 750 P.2d 1301, 1303 (Wash. Ct. App. 1988) (deferring to the
Podiatry Board's expertise, noting with seeming approval reliance on evidence that the kind of surgery
in question (on the ends of the tibia and fibula) was "common to a podiatrist's practice in Washington
and nationwide").
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niceties merely highlight the continued elevation of defined authority over
demonstrated ability.
Ironically, a principal feature of a now-abandoned scope-of-practice
scheme noted in the Connecticut Supreme Court's review of the legislative
history of podiatry/chiropody regulation is far preferable to that embodied
in many current laws. Prior to its repeal in 1937, the Connecticut Podiatry
Act included in its practice statement the "treatment of functional
disturbances of the feet as taught and practiced in the schools of chiropody
recognized by the examining board., 66 Thus, the legal parameters of
podiatry's practice authority were explicitly tied to the education and
training of its practitioners. In this, ability and function guided legal
authority and form, and, one assumes, issues turned not on judges'
guesstimates of the "connection of the ankle bones to the leg bones," but
rather upon the trained ability of podiatrists to treat these bones.
IV. Where Should We Go from Here? Some Recommendations for
Change
Measures like these, combined with conflicting scope-of-practice
laws and the inter-professional conflicts set in motion by history,
demonstrate the overwhelming need for major policy changes. Given
entrenched interests and almost-rote patterns of behavior, individual HCPs
and their organizations will not eagerly embrace reform, but change is
essential if "protection of the public" is to be anything more than a
gossamer-thin disguise for professional self-interest embedded in law. It is
therefore legislators and regulators who must take the lead.
One of the most urgently needed policy reforms is greater consistency
in scope-of-practice laws. Instead of the widely disparate practice
parameters encountered by most providers both between and within states,
policymakers should promote uniform regulation for each profession. And
the scope of practice conferred upon each should be as expansive as
possible, consistent with safe and effective practice, for only then will
health-care consumers reap the benefits of increased access to high-quality
care at reduced cost. (And, in weighing alternatives, policymakers would
be well-advised to look to the evidence of safe practice in those states
"using the least restrictive practice acts for each profession., 67) This
approach would be consistent with-in fact, it would build upon--existing
commonalities of education, training, and licensing examination standards
within each profession. Increased uniformity would lead to greater
understanding of professional roles and abilities among the respective
66 Conn. State Med. Soc'y v. Conn. Bd. of Exam'rs in Podiatry, 546 A.2d 830, 836 (Conn.
1988) (emphasis added).
67 TASKFORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 28.
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HCP groups and the general public, more options for consumers, increased
mobility for providers, and optimal utilization68 of the human and other
resources that together make up our "health care delivery system." And the
normative, rather than mandatory, nature of uniformity would guide the
states, while preserving their traditional "responsibility for enacting and
implementing practice authority legislation for the health professions. '69
Increased uniformity must be accompanied by increased flexibility in
the regulatory process in order to facilitate the functional expansion of
existing roles and the recognition of emerging roles as health care
continues to evolve.7° Every regulatory scheme should include clear
standards and mechanisms for the demonstration of expanded professional
competence. This approach would accomplish three things. It would
acknowledge the reality of ever-increasing knowledge and skills among all
HCPs and spare legislators the headache of having to proceed as if each
such occasion were the first and last. It would also eliminate the
gymnastics now required of HCP groups who seek expanded scopes of
practice but whose best evidence of competence is past practice that was,
by definition, illegal. Additionally, the availability of such mechanisms,
together with the articulation of standards for recognition, would at least
partially re-align the balance between objective, practice-based
assessments of competence and raw political power.
Finally, any attempt at reform must explicitly acknowledge, and
accommodate, existing and evolving overlaps among the professional
competencies of various HCP groups. It should by now be obvious that our
"exclusive" scope-of-practice system has resulted in debilitating
pathologies, both legal and practical. Indeed, if one steps outside of our
own particular history, it is easy to see that a regulatory system will be
deeply flawed from the outset if its fundamental purpose is to confer legal
validation on the claims of private groups to exclusive ownership of
various spheres of knowledge and competence. And the flaw is only
magnified when such assertions of exclusive authority are legally defined
to include an assumption of universal ability as to each member of the
group. Such a system is factually unfounded, legally indefensible-and, let
us remember, bad for the health of the American people. By perpetuating a
"mine, and therefore not yours" practice culture, current laws erect, rather
68 See INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM: A NEW HEALTH SYSTEM
FOR THE 21 ST CENTURY (2001); U.S. Health Care Delivery System Needs Major Overhaul To Improve
Quality and Service, NAT'L ACAD. NEWS, Mar. 1, 2001 ("America's health system is a tangled, highly
fragmented web that often wastes resources by providing unnecessary services and duplicating efforts,
leaving unaccountable gaps in care and failing to build on the strengths of all health professionals."
(emphasis added)).
69 TASKFORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 29.
70 See generally CATHERINE DOWER ET AL., CENTER FOR THE HEALTH PROFESSIONS,
PROFILING THE PROFESSIONS: A MODEL FOR EVALUATING EMERGING HEALTH PROFESSIONS (2001).
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than remove, barriers to inter-professional collaboration, practice, and
respect. They also continue to divert attention and resources from the
business at hand: seeing to the well-being of people who need health care,
rather than refereeing among the claims of the various professionals who
would provide it.
I have no doubt that policymakers seeking to effectuate these reform
principles will encounter major opposition. After all, laws that emphasize
uniformity, flexibility, and shared professional competence will threaten
some, perhaps many, entrenched interests. Others will dismiss these goals
as unnecessary or unachievable. While I hope that the necessity is by now
obvious to readers of this Essay, it is appropriate to ask: "Is this doable?"
Yes, it is, and I would like to close by offering two examples of reform
efforts that have incorporated these goals.
V. Real Change Is Possible: Two Examples of Progressive Scope-of-
Practice Regulations
A. Colorado: Regulating Psychotherapy and the Mental Health
Professions
After dealing with years of disputes arising from conflicting
prerogatives and scopes of practice, Colorado took full advantage of a
scheduled "sunset review" to fashion an innovative regulatory scheme
covering all mental health-care providers other than physicians. Among its
many noteworthy provisions, the 1998 legislation 7' established public-
member majorities on the boards charged with regulating each profession,
articulated uniform grounds for discipline to be used by all boards, created
the "Confidential Letter of Concern" as an additional disciplinary option
available to boards, and mandated the disclosure of specified information
72
to clients. These aspects alone would warrant special praise because they
address many of the concerns that have long been associated with
professional licensure generally. 73 The truly remarkable provisions of the
legislation, however, seek to resolve some of the thorny scope-of-practice
problems described above.
71 COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-43-201-710 (West 2002).
72 § 12-43-214.
73 See, e.g., TASKFORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at v-vi.
Recommendation 3-Individual professional boards in the states must be more
accountable to the public by significantly increasing the representation of public,
non-professional members. Public members should be at least one-third of each
professional board.
Recommendation 4-States should require professional boards to provide practice-
relevant information about their licensees to the public in a clear and
comprehensible manner. Legislators should also work to change laws that prohibit
the disclosure of malpractice settlements and other relevant concerns to the public.
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To begin with, the legislative drafters recognized that the regulation
of HCPs does not have to be an all-or-nothing proposition. Rather, they
understood that statutory requirements governing various provider groups
can and should be directly tied to the goal of forestalling harm to the
general public. The legislation therefore establishes gradients of
regulation: Psychologists, professional counselors, marriage and family
therapists and social workers are licensed or registered (depending upon
education, training, successful examination and degree of independence or
supervision), while unlicensed psychotherapists are listed in a state-
compiled database.
For the licensed or registered HCP groups, the legislation confers the
legal right to use particular titles and articulates the scope of practice
applicable to each category. Significantly, the scopes are phrased broadly
("includes, but is not limited to"7 4), and one actually provides for
continued professional evolution by adding that the "practice also may
encompass other current or developing modalities and techniques that are
consistent with this scope."75 Furthermore, while practice in each group is
limited to license-holders, their scopes of practice are shared or
overlapping, rather than exclusive: "Nothing in this article shall be
construed to prohibit any member of any other profession who is duly
licensed or certified pursuant to the laws of this state from rendering
service consistent with his or her training and professional ethics"' 76 or "to
prevent the practice of psychotherapy by unlicensed persons who are listed
"77with the state ....
In addition to providing for licensed or registered mental-health
professionals, the law also acknowledges and seeks to regularize the
practice of unlicensed psychotherapists and extends some regulatory
oversight to their activities. 78 No unlicensed psychotherapist may practice
in Colorado unless listed in a state database maintained by the State
Grievance Board.79 To be listed, applicants must meet minimum
requirements of education, experience or examination, ° including
completion of a jurisprudence workshop and examination. These
practitioners are subject to the same requirements of confidentiality and




78 § 12-43-701(3). The definition of "psychotherapy" includes "treatment, diagnosis,
testing, assessment, or counseling in a professional relationship" of mental, emotional, relational,
attitudinal, conditions. The definition contains the following statement: "It is the intent of the general
assembly that the definition of psychotherapy ... be interpreted in its narrowest sense to regulate only
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privileged communications that govern other mental-health professionals,
and to the same grounds for discipline.
81
What has the Colorado legislation accomplished? A great deal,
indeed. First, it has led to a reduction in the number of formal and informal
intra/inter-professional turf squabbles between mental health professionals.
In addition, the law establishes a comprehensive, appropriately nuanced,
scheme for the regulation of mental health-care providers. It defines the
practices of the various disciplines without limiting the ability of other
groups to practice their professions. It provides for the evolution of
professional abilities by framing the scopes of practice broadly. And it
protects the public by extending the imperative of confidentiality to all
regulated providers; by mandating disclosure of information concerning
therapeutic methods and techniques, as well as likely duration and cost; by
providing for the appropriate discipline of practitioners, whether licensed
or unlicensed; and-remember the fundamental purpose of licensure?-by
offering a reliable indicium of who is trained and able to do what. The
rightness. of this legislative approach is captured in one of the law's
general provisions, which speaks directly and clearly to the all-too-
uncommon reconciliation of legal authority and professional ability. It says
simply this: "Notwithstanding any other provision of this article, no
licensee, registrant, or unlicensed psychotherapist is authorized to practice
outside of or beyond his or her area of training, experience, or
competence.
82
This provision is as sensible as it is extraordinary. By defining
practice authority in terms of ability, this law correctly reorients the
regulatory focus from providers' status to their training and skills. This is a
simple conceptual shift, but it is essential to the project of regulatory
reform. The Colorado legislation should inspire policymakers in other
states as they seek to improve their own laws governing HCPs.
B. Ontario: The Regulated Health Professions Act
In 1991, the province of Ontario, Canada enacted the long-considered
and precedent-setting Regulated Health Professions Act83 ("RHPA") that
established a wholly new regulatory framework for all of the health-care
professions. Among its stated objectives were promoting high-quality care,
making the regulated health-care professions accountable to the public,
giving patients access to HCPs of their choice, and achieving regulatory




83 The Regulated Health Professions Act, R.S.O., ch. 18 (1991) (Can.).
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In pursuit of these objectives, the RHPA "shift[ed] from profession-
centered regulation to public interest regulation,' 8 4 and replaced a
regulatory framework that some legislators had described as a congeries of
individual practice acts reflecting "monopolistic scopes of practice"85
(discussed more fully below). Indeed, one of the RHPA's "central
organizing concepts," designed to promote flexibility and ensure the
provision of quality care, "[was] the replacement of monopolistic or
exclusive scopes of practice with a system of controlled acts. These
controlled acts can be authorized to two or more professions where their
scopes overlap."86
The RHPA established a common organizational and operational
framework for regulating Ontario's twenty-three regulated health-care
professions. It simultaneously created a new body, the Health Professions
Regulatory Advisory Council (none of whose members may be regulated
HCPs) that continuously evaluates regulatory effectiveness and advises the
Minister of Health and Long-Term Care on needed reforms.87
The RHPA's common framework is complemented by (1) a
procedural code that applies to all HCPs, and (2) a series of separate,
profession-specific enactments authorizing each professional regulatory
College" to set and enforce standards for their individual professions. The
net result is a creative and comprehensive scheme that should be of broad
interest to policymakers committed to progressive regulation.
For purposes of this Essay, however, I wish to focus especially on the
RHPA's provisions addressing scope-of-practice issues, which include a
number of innovative and effective features. As the drafting committee
noted in explaining its rationale, the then-current regulatory system had
both failed to protect the public and discouraged flexibility and innovation.
84 Rob Alder, Foreword to HEALTH PROFESSIONS REGULATORY ADVISORY COUNCIL,
ADJUSTING THE BALANCE: A REVIEW OF THE REGULATED HEALTH PROFESSIONS ACT (2001)
[hereinafter ADJUSTING THE BALANCE].
85 HEALTH PROFESSIONS LEGISLATION REVIEW COMMITTEE, GOVERNMENT OF ONTARIO,
STRIKING A NEW BALANCE: A BLUEPRINT FOR THE REGULATION OF ONTARIO'S HEALTH
PROFESSIONS (1989) [hereinafter STRIKING A NEW BALANCE].
86 ADJUSTING THE BALANCE, supra note 84, at 18.
87 This Council has many of the features of the National Policy Advisory Group
recommended in the Pew Taskforce Report. See, e.g., TASKFORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 1-13, 27-
29.
Recommendation I-Congress should establish a national policy advisory body
that will research, develop and publish national scopes of practice and continuing
competency standards for state legislatures to implement.
Recommendation 7-The national policy advisory body . . . should develop
standards, including model legislative language, for uniform practice authority
acts for the health professions. These standards and models would be based on a
wide range of evidence regarding the competence of the professions to provide
safe and effective health care.
88 These Colleges are somewhat akin to a combination of state licensing boards and
professional associations in the United States.
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The new scheme, in contrast, was "based on the principle that the sole
purpose of professional regulation is to protect the public interest," and not
to enhance any profession's economic power or to raise its status.8 9 In
effectuating this principle, the RHPA abandoned the previous licensing
acts that had conferred an exclusive scope and right of practice on each
health-care profession. These various acts were replaced by a multi-faceted
scope-of-practice mechanism that draws upon both the general framework
and the profession-specific acts described above. This regulatory
mechanism, which consists of five components, has now operated
successfully for almost a decade. And a formal multi-year review of the
system's effectiveness reflected unanimity on the scope-of-practice
provisions: "One of the more notable findings to emerge from HPRAC's
consultation process was the fact that no submissions suggested that the
RHPA controlled acts system should be discarded or that Ontario should
return to the previous system of monopolistic or exclusive scopes of
practice." 90
The first component is a series of statutory scope-of-practice
statements-one for each of the regulated professions-which set out
"what the profession does; the methods it uses; [and] the purposes for
which it does it."9' The Nursing Act statement, for example, reads as
follows: "The practice of nursing is the promotion of health and the
assessment of, the provision of care for, and the treatment of health
conditions by supportive, preventive, therapeutic, palliative, and
rehabilitative means in order to attain or maintain optimal function." 92
Such statements, by providing a context for each profession's practice, are
equally valuable to the public, government regulators, and the professions
themselves. Most importantly, these statements do not claim or confer
"exclusive" practice authority for any one profession; rather, they
recognize overlaps in practice. They say only "this is what we do," not
"this is what we do, and therefore no one else can do it." This non-
exclusive approach acknowledges that other health-care professions can
provide the same services through overlapping practices. And, by so
acknowledging, this approach forestalls many of the "turf' issues that
bedevil regimes based upon mutual exclusivity.
The second and third components of Ontario's scope-of-practice
mechanism, "controlled acts" and "authorized acts," are clearly
interrelated. Together, they add up to a fundamental and remarkable
transformation of regulatory policy by shifting the focus from who to what
89 STRIKING A NEW BALANCE, supra note 85, at 13-14.
90 ADJUSTING THE BALANCE, supra note 84, at 19.
91 STRIKING A NEW BALANCE, supra note 85, at 3.
92 An Act Respecting the Regulation of the Profession of Nursing, R.S.O. ch. 32, § 3 (1991)
(Can.).
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is potentially dangerous to the public-a far more relevant and objectively
answered question. By thus shifting its focus, the legislature was able to
identify a number of health-care activities that, by their very natures, pose
a significant risk of harm if not performed by qualified providers. The
RHPA specifies thirteen such activities as "controlled acts. 93 They
include, for example, setting or casting a bone fracture; prescribing,
dispensing, selling, or compounding a drug; performing a procedure on
tissue below the dermis; and managing labor or delivering a baby.
Controlled acts may be performed only by regulated providers authorized
to do so by their own profession-specific acts.94 Services or activities not
falling within the ambit of one or more of these controlled acts are deemed
to be in the public domain and may therefore be performed by anyone.
This concept of controlled and authorized acts is central to the RHPA
framework. It eliminates the old exclusive-scope-of-practice scheme and
explicitly allows for shared authority over controlled acts, as between two
or more health-care professions, if their relevant professional knowledge
and skills overlap. 95 Thus, some regulated professions--dieticians, for
example-have no authority to perform controlled acts, while other
professions are authorized to perform a few or many. And even if a
profession as a whole has the authority to perform a controlled act, the
profession's College may still determine that a given individual or class
within the profession should not be permitted to do so.
The last two components of RHPA's scope-of-practice mechanism
are the "title protection" and "harm" clauses. The former clause provides
that only members of each regulated health-care profession may use
certain specified titles and prohibits anyone else from either using, or
claiming to possess the qualifications signified by, those titles. The "harm
clause' 96 is something of a safety net, designed to cover potentially
dangerous services not explicitly encompassed by the controlled acts
provisions. It imposes limits on the giving of any health treatment and
93 The Regulated Health Professions Act, R.S.O., ch. 18, § 27(2) (1991) (Can.).
94 Controlled acts can be delegated, as appropriate. See §§ 27-30; see also The College of
Physicians & Surgeons of Ontario, Policy Statement #1: The Delegation of Controlled Acts, in
MEMBERS' DIALOGUE, special insert (1999), available at http://www.cpso.on.ca/Policies/
delegation.htm (last visited Apr. 28. 2002).
The RHPA requires the physician to confine medical practice to those areas of
medicine in which he or she is suitably trained and experienced. Since the
physician is under an obligation to delegate the performance of controlled acts
only where it is clinically appropriate and necessary in the circumstances, it
follows that a physician may only delegate those controlled acts for which he or
she personally has the required knowledge, skill and judgment to perform.
Therefore, it would be inappropriate for a physician to delegate to someone
else the performance of a controlled act he or she is not capable of performing
personally, and which does not form part of his or her regular practice and daily
competence.
95 ADJUSTING THE BALANCE, supra note 84, at 18.
96 § 30(1).
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advice "in circumstances in which it is reasonably foreseeable that serious
physical harm may result." Uniquely, the harm clause applies "to
unregulated practitioners and the general public as well as to regulated
health professionals acting outside their scope of practice. 97
With the RHPA, Ontario has created a sophisticated and effective
mechanism for regulating health-care providers' scopes of practice.
Several of the law's individual features are remarkable in their own
right-particularly its focus on controlled acts rather than exclusive scopes
of practice. Taken together, they add up to a regulatory system that should
be (and has been98) a model for policymakers charged with protecting the
public's health and freedom of choice while containing costs and
promoting professional evolution within the health-care professions.
Conclusion
I hope I have succeeded in offering practical insights for
policymakers to use in their continued struggle with proposed reforms in
the regulation of health care providers. By understanding the origins and
continued effects of the "first in time, first in right" dynamic produced by
the omnibus medical practice acts, and by recognizing that there are
models that both value public protection more than professional
prerogatives and allow clinical ability to guide legal authority,
policymakers can be better positioned to promote truly effective changes
in the scope-of-practice laws. And the influence of these laws permeates
the entire health care system. The availability of competent, affordable
health care surely depends on many factors, but chief among them must be
the rationality of the education, utilization and payment systems for the
human care providers. Reconfiguring the practice laws will not address all
the daunting health care issues, but it will correct a widespread, needlessly
wasteful, and continually divisive problem.
While I am optimistic that these reforms can be accomplished, my
experience cautions against exuberance. Some of the reasons are well-
captured in a remarkably pertinent article, entitled Will Disruptive
Innovations Cure Health Care?99 that was published not long ago by two
physicians and one professor of business administration. Let me conclude
by sharing some of their comments, which echo my own thoughts.
From their opening statement that "[h]ealth care may be the most
entrenched, change-averse industry in the United States,"100 to their
97 ADJUSTING THE BALANCE, supra note 84, at 34.
98 See, e.g., Health Professions Act, R.S.A., ch. H-7 (2000) (Can.).
99 Clayton M. Christensen et al., Will Disruptive Innovations Cure Health Care?, HARV.
Bus. REV., Sept.-Oct. 2000, at 102.
100 Id. at 102.
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concluding observation that "disruption is the fundamental mechanism
through which we will build a higher quality, more convenient, and lower
cost health care system,"'O' these authors have reinforced the central
themes of the scope-of-practice tussles I have reviewed. Extracting lessons
from patterns of industrial innovation, 0 2 they note that disruptive
innovations-that is, "cheaper, simpler, more convenient products or
services that ... meet the needs of the vast majority of users"'° 3-have
over time "been one of the fundamental mechanisms through which the
quality of our lives has improved." 1 4 These sorts of innovations take hold
by "enabling a larger population of less-skilled people to do in a more
convenient, less expensive setting things that historically could be
performed only by expensive specialists in centralized, inconvenient
locations.'
0 5
How do these lessons apply to health care generally, and to scope of
practice specifically? The authors offer several examples:
We need diagnostic and therapeutic advances that allow nurse
practitioners to treat diseases that used to require a physician's care.., or
primary care physicians to treat conditions that used to require
specialists. 1
06
As specialist physicians continue to concentrate on curing the most
incurable of illnesses for the sickest of patients, less-skilled practitioners
could take on more complex roles than they are currently being allowed
to do. Already, a host of over-the-counter drugs allow patients to
administer care that used to require a doctor's prescription. Nurse
practitioners are capable of treating many ailments that used to require a
physician's care. And new procedures like angioplasty are allowing
cardiologists to treat patients that in the past would have needed the
services of open-heart surgeons.1
07
In reviewing the effects of these kinds of innovations in the treatment
of diabetes and coronary artery disease, the authors note efficiency gains,
"But more important, no compromises in quality were made."' '
101 Id. at 112.
102 Examples include personal computers (rather than mainframes), the telephone (rather
than the telegraph), photocopying (rather than printing), and the box camera (rather than the black-
cloaked, tripod-bound, professional behemoth).
103 Christensen, supra note 99, at 104.
104 Id. at 105.
105 Id.
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If such innovations can produce high quality care in more efficient and
convenient ways, why aren't they more widely embraced? "Unfortunately,
the people and institutions whose livelihoods they threaten often resist
them. , 10 9
Take nurse practitioners .... [M]any states have regulations that prevent
nurse practitioners from diagnosing diseases or from prescribing
treatment that they are fully capable of handling. The flawed rationale
behind such policies is that because nurse practitioners are not as highly
trained as physicians, they are not capable of providing care of
comparable quality. This is the same logic that minicomputer makers
used to discredit the personal computer. When a physician diagnoses a
simple infectious disease, the patient uses only that fraction of the
physician's training that relates to simple infectious diseases. Studies
have shown that nurse practitioners with comparable training in simple
infectious diseases can provide care of comparable quality . . . even
though they lack training in more complex disorders.
110
Some nearsighted advocates of patients' rights assert that nurse
practitioners might not have the judgment to recognize when a disorder is
beyond their expertise. But family practice doctors recognize when they
can treat a disorder and when it merits referral to a specialist. Surely
nurse practitioners .. .can ... do the same thing. The real reason for
blocking such disruption, we suspect, is the predictable desire of
physicians to preserve their traditional market hegemony. 11'
In one final observation particularly salient for our purposes, the
authors pointedly note the difficulty in overcoming the inertia of
regulation:
Attempts to use regulation to stave off disruptive attacks are quite
common . . . .Unfortunately, regulators are inclined to be even more
protective of the entrenched professions and institutions in health
care . . . . The links between those institutions, federal and state
regulators, and insurance companies are strong; they are wielded to
preserve the status quo. (Nothing else could explain why nurse




110 Id at 108.
111 Id.
112 Id. at 112.
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Although it may be somewhat unorthodox to quote so extensively
from another article, I have done so because the authors of Disruptive
Innovations have beautifully captured the essence of the obstacles to
meaningful policy reform in the scope-of-practice context. It is my hope
that, by acquainting policymakers with the historical foundations of the
current regulatory framework and its shortcomings, and by offering some
principles and models upon which they might usefully rely in designing
the needed reforms, this essay will help to illuminate the way forward.
